THE NDP APPEARS to be in its death throes, an expiring force in Canadian politics. It is intellectually bankrupt, financially broke, and reeling politically. Consider the coming and passing of 1994 -exactly a half century since the election of the Saskatchewan CCF as North America's first socialist government -with the absence of a major celebration. There has been a virtual lack of conscious acknowledgement of it Contrast this relative silence to the conference, publications, self-congratulatory back slapping, and commitment to ideological renewal which greeted the fiftieth anniversary of the Regina Manifesto in 1983. Although the party then only ruled in Manitoba, there was a strong sense that its fortunes were on the rise. As 1995 began it governed in three provinces including the two wealthiest in terms of per capita incomes. This sway over more than half of Canadians, however, appears temporary and tenuous. By the end of 1995 the party will have almost certainly lost Ontario, and British Columbia appears set to leave the fold soon after. Saskatchewan may gain a new distinction: the home of English North America's last social democratic government in this century. 
performance in office. The cabinet was not prepared to practise what it had preached. What did solemn talk of minimum and increased corporate taxes, higher minimum wages, and more social services produce? In the 1992-93 fiscal year, the NDP government collected less in corporate taxes than it did in gasoline and tobacco taxes combined. For 1994-95, it was projecting the highest ever expenditures to service the public debt (about $8 billion, a whopping 14 per cent increase in one year). Its budget boasted that Ontario's corporate taxes and manufacturing wages (after adding health care costs) were lower than in the United States, and that the public service was to shrink in size.
Such policy reversals did not resonate with the message party leaders preached in opposition and which members had embraced fervently at policy conventions. The gulf between leadership behaviour in office and party members' older, undevised ideological image of the NDP became so wide that the party lost core supporters who felt betrayed or ignored. This was not the result of misadventure and misfortune for that implies bad luck. It was the product of miscalculation and mismanagement, of folly and design, of reliance on and gullibility in platitudes and shibboleths. For socialist puritans, like George Ehring and Wayne Roberts, it reflected a lack of leadership mettle.
What of the NDP's current plight and condition? How do the four studies reviewed here expand our appreciation of the Canadian social democratic impulse? Five of the six authors are Ontarians; much of their material is Ontario-related. This misleads somewhat in illuminating the party's historical and current base. The party failed to win a seat there in the 1993 election, and its popular vote there was less than its national average. Nevertheless, the NDP's performance in Ontario is critical to its prospects as a national, and not merely regional, force. As Ehring and Roberts note in Giving Away A Miracle, Ontario's wealth, size, industrial concentration, and diversity permits a better test case than, say, relatively poor and dependent Saskatchewan or Manitoba, to determine whether the NDP is able to alter fundamental economic, social, and ultimately political relations, (xii)
The short story line in Giving Away A Miracle is simple and straightforward: Bob Rae is a paranoid megalomaniac who is a snake in the pocket of the working class. The extended story line is structured around "ten deadly sins" which have trapped the NDP, shaping and determining its performance in office. The authors judge it an unqualified failure. Ehring and Roberts are backroom insiders who have toiled in the political trenches: managing local campaigns, canvassing households, debating at conventions. Both have worked for unions, although they hold their leaders in contempt: "The old fat cat cartoon capitalist had a pot belly and a cigar. Now those are the trademarks of the union leader." (35) They are permanent, leftist critics of the party. Their account, running back to 1970, is based largely on interviews, observations, and press reports. It is not so much a history, however, ^Ontario Budget, 5 May 1994,14,38.97, and 113.
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as an examination of the purported endemic problems which cripple the NDP and render it incapable of fulfilling the hopes and dreams of its supporters.
The authors are familiar with much of the academic literature on the party, but mey eschew footnotes and some rudimentary principles of scholarship in favour of a slapdash, shotgun, journalistic, and oft times muckraking style that is brash, irreverent, lively, and an easy read. Innuendo runs rampant Robin Sears, the one time apparatchik in the Socialist International and functionary in the federal and Ontario NDP, is labelled Boy Stalin. (159) The authors live up to their prefatory promise: "we have tried to make readers suffer through as little theory as possible before getting to the gossip and anecdotes that make up most of this book." (xii) Most everybody who has been anybody in and around the party makes an appearance. Welcome are the texts of the Liberal-NDP Accord of 1985 (376-7) and the NDP'S 1990 platform, "An Agenda for People." (277-9) They are measuring rods for the output of the governing parties. The minority Liberals were compelled to deliver on the modest agenda dictated for them by the NDP. The NDP, unfettered by the need to compromise with others, reneged on much of its winning platform. It jettisoned most of its as impractical, unwise, or unattainable-items such as public automobile insurance, an extra billion dollars in corporate tax revenues (they actually shrank), and an increase of the minimum wage to 60 per cent of the average industrial wage.
The book's first draft was written before the NDP'S startling upset win of 1990. Ehring and Roberts set out originally to explain why the NDP was a chronic loser and why it had to change direction if it ever hoped to come to power. The "deadly sins" identified include: a lack of new ideas, a bureaucratic relationship with the labour movement, the absence of a "down-to-earth" economic plan; a hopelessly romantic view of heroic, victimized workers; intolerance of internal dissent (the NDP=the No Dissent Party); distrust of social movements; an inability to "connect" with the multicultural community; a wanting media strategy; and a misunderstanding of the Liberals. This is followed by a breezy and judgmental review of the party's performance dating back to Stephen Lewis's ascension to the leadership.
Despite the party's mortal shortcomings, the NDP did win and come to power. The authors recognize that it was "in the right place at the right time" (288) as the Liberals self-destructed. To come to terms with this new reality and the undermining of their thesis that the NDP is pathologically programmed to fail electorally, a new section was added. Although the book's title capitalizes on the NDP holding office, this section is but one-fifth the volume's length. It places the NDP government once again in the context of the "deadly sins. The vituperative critique of the Rae government is so unrelentingly negative that it may unintentionally generate sympathy for it Certainly the reversals, the litany of broken campaign pledges, the faux pas, and the petty scandals are all here -from Sunday shopping to casinos to ministerial lying and misbehaviour. The virginal standards demanded by Rae when in opposition -the implication that NDpers are innately ethically superior and devoid of the character flaws of Liberals and Conservatives -was self-righteous puffery and fluffery, pious nonsense exposed as such. The NDP came to be hoisted, properly, on its own petard. But there is no acknowledgement of anything the government has done that may merit some modest, if not unstinting, praise. Consider the NDP'S salvaging of the Algoma steel plant and thousands of jobs in Sault Ste. Marie after the hard-headed business community gave up on it Rather than allocating some credit to the Rae government for its perseverance and efforts on the workers' and city's behalf, this project is presented as a wasteful drain on the public treasury, a failed experiment in worker ownership. (330-1) Was it? Do the workers think so?
Ehring and Roberts are unperturbed by contradictions or by the need for some qualifications in their analyses. The party is described as oligarchic; the leadership is "hand-picked by the party establishment.'' (13) So how was Ehring elected a party vice-president? Rae is attacked for not talking about "class, gender, or race exploitation." (338) So why did he name eleven women to his cabinet of 26 and why did the NDP insist on employment equity and pay equity legislation? They condemn the NDP for failing to "connect" with multicultural and women's groups. So why did the government (foolishly) run job advertisements telling white males they need not apply? They lament that the party has not totally surrendered to social movements. The problem is that much of the public thinks it has done so. The pursuit of political correctness may thus result in political irrelevance and marginalization. The unconditional endorsement of social movements' objectives may lead to inevitable cross-pressures. In seeking to placate both environmentalists and forestry workers it is easy to alienate both and to dismay the broader public, as the NDP experience in British Columbia demonstrated. Politically it would make sense to cater to the women's movement and the labour movement if their leaders can deliver the majority of women's and workers' votes; the reality is that they cannot The authors offer some excellent insights into party-labour relations and the NDP'S difficulty in selling its message among the working, non-unionized, poor. Gerry Caplan's Just Causes comes as a heuristic counterpoint, a welcome tonic, after digesting Ehring and Roberts. It offers insight into why he is part of die NDP establishment and one of its brain trusters, someone with genuine influence, just as their book offers insight into their comfortable role as party rebels. They expect to be and appear to relish being on the losing side in party tussles, uncomfortable in a party that must govern rather than merely agitate. Caplan, in contrast, is a skilled political operative, a general who has managed federal and provincial NDP campaigns. He has been close to and respectful of die Lewis family: David, Stephen, Michael, and Janet -a dynastic influence in die party running back to die 1930s. Caplan has also served beyond die political barricades: Brian Mulroney appointed him to co-chair a Task Force on Broadcasting Policy; dien Bob Rae recruited him to co-chair a Royal Commission on Education.
Just Causes is drawn from over 500 columns written for die Toronto Star between 1983 and 1993. About one fifth of diem appear here, organized in 17 short, thematic, sections with titles such as "Just Liberals," "The American Way," "Native Wrongs," "Women's Equality," and "Socialist Dreams and Nightmares." Well-written, lucid, humanistic, compassionate, they are bitterly and bitingly critical of die excesses of capitalism and die oppression of imperialism. They are crafted, principled, coherent and intelligent, unlike much of die mush, fudge, and drivel of many columnists. At times, as in his eulogy to die CBC's Barbara Frum (235-7), Caplan is moving. He denounces racism and anti-Semitism, decries poverty amid privilege. He derides "jock capitalism" widi its "dog-eat-dog, exploitation of-man-by-man system" (75, 113), and snipes at financial barons and interests. He does not care much for communism eidier but has less to say about it, presenting democratic socialism as a third way, a middle ground between two scourges. One senses from Caplan's later columns, in 1993, tinges of sadness; there is a creeping pessimism replacing earlier buoyancy. This reflects well the contemporary, diseased, condition of the NDP. As the years pass, his columns will yellow and fade in their relevance to the ever evolving agenda of public affairs. Nevertheless they will retain their punchiness, emitting a strong and rich flavour of the issues, personalities, and times they report on and judge. That is a respectable legacy for any book. Norman Penner's From Protest to Power is, unlike the two foregoing books, an academic study. As such it must sustain a more systematic and rigorous appraisal, one consistent with its scholarly veneer. Replete with footnotes and bibliography, it is, on the whole, workmanlike and competent, but it contains too many irksome lapses and errors. They go beyond the normal debatable interpretations of any study. Keith Archer and Alan Whitehom's booklet (its text is 20 pages) is focused and specific, reflective of the behavioural persuasion in political science. Rich with precise data, tight in its analysis, it is disciplined in a way mat the other studies reviewed here are not In examining organized labour's role in the NDP, they offer a survey conducted at the federal parry's 1987 convention. They conclude that the party is not controlled by organized labour, although the union movement is a significant lobby within the party. (19) They look for sociological and ideological differences between union delegates (who usually make up 20-30 per cent of all delegates) and other delegates (most of whom are constituency representatives). They found that delegates' subjective self-images were consistent with objective reality: unionists were more likely to see themselves as working class whereas non-unionists were more likely to have middle or upper middle class self-images. Unsurprisingly and in corroboration, unionists as a group were less educated and more likely held blue-collar jobs, while other delegates tended to be very well educated, many of them professionals. As an antidote to Penner's accurate observation that the NDP shuns the "socialist" or "social democratic" label in its propaganda, earlier survey studies reported on by Archer and Whitehorn reveal that over three-quarters of NDPers nevertheless chose one of these two labels to describe themselves when offered a list that includes terms such as "social gospel," "liberal," "marxist," "reformer," "ecologist," and "populist." (10) Non-unionist NDPers were more likely to choose "socialist" than the unionists; the latter were almost three times as likely to prefer calling themselves "social democrats" to "socialist" (11) Similarly, when offered a left-right scale for self-placement union delegates collectively did not place themselves as far to the left as the other delegates.
A particularly insightful part of this study is its comparative analysis of the attitudes of NDPers, Liberals, and Conservatives. It contrasts responses to policy issues based on parallel surveys conducted of delegates to the 1983 Conservative and the 1984 Liberal leadership conventions, the ones that selected Brian Mulroney
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and John Turner respectively. (12-3) The findings here are illuminating, testing and confirming what for many are casual, educated hunches. The eight issues analyzed are: continentalism, corporate power, privatization, social security, bilingualism, civil rights, moralism, and foreign policy hawkishness. The attitudinal discontinuities between union and non-union NDP delegates were remarkably narrow. They paled in contrast to the gaps between NDP attitudes collectively and those of Liberals and Conservatives. Consider, for example, the issue of privatization: on an ascending 6 point scale, non-unionist NDPers scored a low of. 17, unionist NDPers .37, Liberals 2.21, and Conservatives 4. (13) On this and all the other issues, except corporate power, the union delegates were more "rightist" or "centrist'* than other NDP delegates. The one issue on which die NDP unionists were closer to the Liberals than they were to the NDP constituency delegates was on bilingualism -the latter were the most pro-bilingual, followed by the Liberals.
Given the current dilapidated condition of the NDP, the substantial attitudinal breaks between NDPers on the one hand and the older parties' delegates on the other, are arresting and suggestive. On all issues, save civil liberties, the Liberals come across as being in the centre, between the NDP and the Conservatives. One suspects, reasonably, that Reformers would be further to the right than the Conservatives. The centrism of the Liberals is no new discovery, an old chestnut in Canadian political history and a source of pride to Liberal partisans. Nevertheless it helps to explain yet again why the Liberals have been, by far, the most successful party in national politics in this century. When NDPers or their potential supporters fear a rising right, conservatism, or Conservative hegemony, many of them will be swayed as strategic voters to the Liberal banner as occurred in 1988 and 1993. This is logical behaviour for, as Archer and Whitehorn's data demonstrate, the Liberals are closer to them ideologically.
Will the NDP wither away as did Social Credit and the Communists, and before them, the Progressives? Not likely. Some faithful followers -however shrunken their ranks -will continue to bask in the party's legacy and proclaim its contemporary relevance. The NDP has been too significant a force, too recently, to pass into sudden or permanent retirement. The party's provincial prospects, however, continue to be decidedly brighter than its federal ones. The key to its election successes has been its positioning rather than its posturing. As an ideologicallydriven party, members take their debates and resolutions seriously. As their Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and BC victories of the 1980s and 1990s demonstrated, however, the party did not win because of its platforms but in spite of them. The NDP was elected primarily by default because the governing parties lost the public's confidence in their stewardship. By perseverance and longevity, the NDP generated a measure of grudging acceptance of itself even by traditional doubters. It occasionally became situated as the provincial government in waiting, as the most credible, available alternative to a discredited regime. That is the lesson of the Pawley, Rae, Harcourt, and Romanow triumphs. Since at least the 1970s, it
